Introduction
In the recent literature on monetary policy analysis, several writers have emphasized the distinction between instrument rules-i.e., formulae for setting controllable instrument variables in response to current conditions-and targeting rules, as proposed by Svensson (1997 Svensson ( , 1999 . 1 In a major contribution, Svensson (2003) has presented a sophisticated and comprehensive case for the use of targeting rules, arguing that "monetary-policy practice is better discussed in terms of targeting rules than instrument rules" (2003, p. 429) . 2 The superiority of targeting rules is, moreover, claimed to pertain to both normative and positive perspectives (pp. 428-430). Svensson's paper is rich in both analytical and practical content, and provides insights that can be usefully pondered by all students of monetary policy analysis. It is our belief, nevertheless, that the paper seriously overstates the relative attractiveness of targeting rules, from both normative and positive perspectives, and describes inaccurately the properties of instrument rules. To develop this argument is the purpose of the present paper. As a major part of our argument, one concrete and important claim of Svensson's, regarding interest rate variability induced by instrument rules with strong feedback, is studied in detail. In the wide variety of cases considered, we find all results to be inconsistent with the claim.
The outline of the present paper is as follows. Section 2 presents explanations of the basic concepts and an introduction to the issues. Section 3 then takes up, and disputes, four particular criticisms of instrument rules that are central to the argument in Svensson (2003) , after which Section 4 does the same for two additional criticisms. In Sections 5 and 6, the paper turns to the precise analytical claim mentioned above and develops results in a number of settings that show it to be incorrect. Finally, Section 7 provides a very brief recapitulation.
Basic Ideas
What is the distinction between instrument and targeting rules? A rule of the former type refers, quite simply, to some formula prescribing instrument settings as a function of currently observed variables. Well known examples include the Taylor rule (1993), several interest rate rules studied by McKibbin (1993a, 1993b) , and the activist monetary base rules of McCallum (1988) and Meltzer (1987) . Precisely which variables are observable is of course a matter that can be debated in practical analyses, but is one on which the analyst has to take some explicit position. Note that expectations (based on current information) of present or future variables may be among the variables that the rule responds to. 3 The definition of targeting rules is somewhat more complex. There has been some evolution since Svensson's (1997 Svensson's ( , 1999 introduction of the concept, 4 but his current terminology recognizes both general and specific variants. Basically, a general targeting rule is the specification of a central bank objective function, 5 whereas a specific targeting rule is an optimality condition implied by an objective function together with a specified model of the economy (pp. 448−460). 6 Initially, optimization was presumed to be of the discretionary 2 In what follows, quotations with page-number indications but no author or year indication, refer to that paper, i.e., Svensson (2003) . 3 In cases in which expectations are based on current-period information, however, Svensson refers to this type of policy rule as an "implicit instrument rule." 4 In particular, only specific (not general) targeting rules were considered in Svensson (1997) and they were called "target rules." 5 Svensson (2003, p. 430) further requires that these be "operational objectives" (italics in original), i.e. numerical targets for particular variables, rather than a general concept such as "price stability." 6 Svensson has explained to us that he does not require that a specific targeting rule necessarily expresses an optimality condition, as he has in the past (1997, p. 1136) , and his definition on p. 429 conforms to that explanation. On p. 430, however, he states that "… specific targeting rules essentially specify operational Euler equations." Also, on p. 455 Svensson states that "A specific targeting rule specifies a condition … [that] may be an optimal first-order condition, or an approximate first-order condition." In the remainder of this type, with period-by-period re-optimization based on prevailing "initial conditions," but in Svensson (2003) the possibility of optimization from a "timeless perspective" (see Woodford, 1999 ) is also considered.
It is not our intention to argue that analysis with instrument rules is in all respects preferable to the use of targeting rules. Even if we held that belief, moreover, we would not think it socially desirable for all researchers to employ the same approach. Nevertheless, we are more attracted to analysis with instrument rules than with targeting rules and believe that a few words should be included to indicate why-especially since Svensson's numerous writings argue so strongly in favor of the targeting-rule position.
First, it seems terminologically inappropriate to refer to the specification of the policymaker's objective function as a rule. Obviously, for a given objective function desirable instrument settings-i.e., policy actions-can be very different under the same prevailing conditions depending on the policymaker's preferred model or models of the economy. There are words available to describe policymakers' objectives-for example, "policymakers' objectives"-so there is nothing analytical to be gained by reference to them as "general targeting rules." It is terminologically useful, rather, for objectives and rules to be clearly distinguished. Next, from the substantive perspective, the adoption of an objective function is innocuous if the function accurately represents the central bank's true preferences.
But if it does not represent the true preferences and is made public, as in the scheme suggested in Svensson's Section 5.3.3, then the central bank will be describing its objectives dishonestly to the public, which seems inconsistent with Svensson's emphasis on paper, accordingly, we shall follow Svensson's practice by typically treating specific targeting rules as firstorder optimality conditions. transparency.
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Second, the problem with specific targeting rules-i.e., first-order optimality conditions-is that they are obviously model-dependent. 8 It is unclear which portion of today's macroeconomic models are most questionable, but it is entirely clear that there is much dispute among leading scholars concerning the proper specification of several of the crucial relationships. Yet a condition that implies policy optimality in one model may be highly inappropriate under other specifications. Consequently, an attractive approach to policy design, promoted (e.g.) by McCallum (1988 McCallum ( , 1999 , is to search for an instrument rule that performs at least moderately well-avoiding disasters-in a variety of plausible models.
In other words, it is our belief that it is unwise to restrict policy analysis to optimal-policy exercises, which will typically be optimal only for the single model being utilized. Yet such
analysis is precisely what is contemplated by focus on specific targeting rules.
A good illustration of the model-dependence of optimality conditions is provided in a recent paper by Levin and Williams (2003) , which is a follow-up to the robustness study of Levin, Wieland, and Williams (1999) . The initial experiments of Levin and Williams (2003) involve calculation of the consequences of using a policy rule, designed to be optimal in one model, in other models. The three models in their introductory example are (i) a "New Keynesian" baseline model (NKB) that is highly prominent in recent theoretical research, (ii) an alternative specification (denoted FHP) with more sources of inertia utilized by Fuhrer (2000) , and the empirically-oriented (RS) model of Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) .
Suppose a specific targeting rule is optimal in a calibrated version of the NKB model, with a 7 Svensson has informed us that he would have the central bank explain the discrepancy between its objective function and preferences to the public. We consider that such a need reflects a substantial degree of nontransparency. 8 The existence of model dependency is recognized by Svensson (p. 450 variances of key endogenous variables) are related to policy rule parameters, leaving it to actual policymakers to assign the relevant weights. Examples of this approach appear in some of our previous papers, e.g., Nelson (1999a, 1999b) , as well as in Bryant, Hooper, and Mann (1993) .
Four Main Objections
After some preliminary discussion, Svensson considers the case of central bank (henceforth, CB) commitment to an optimal instrument rule (which he terms an implicit reaction function when the rule includes any current endogenous variables) and concludes that the implied approach is "completely impractical." Indeed, Svensson states that "commitment to an optimal instrument rule has no advocates, as far as I know" (p. 439).
With this particular judgment we have no serious disagreement; see McCallum (1999 McCallum ( , pp. 1490 McCallum ( -1495 , for example. Consequently, Svensson moves on to consideration of simple instrument rules (pp. 439-441), with one subsection entitled "Problems of a commitment to a simple instrument rule" (pp. 441-444). We now examine that subsection's arguments in some detail, since they evidently constitute the most important ingredients of Svensson's position.
In the subsection in question, there are four main objections to instrument rules that are identified and discussed. The first is "(1) the simple instrument rule may be far from optimal in some circumstances" (p. 441). In particular, "[a] first obvious problem for a "A second problem," Svensson states, "is that a commitment to an instrument rule does not leave any room for judgmental adjustments and extra-model information…" (p.
442). This claim is difficult for us to understand, since there seem to be various ways in which judgmental adjustments to instrument rule prescriptions could be made. For example, the interest rate instrument could be set above (or below) the rule-indicated value when policymaker judgments indicate that conditions, not adequately reflected in the CB's formal quantitative models, imply different forecasts and consequently call for additional policy tightening (or loosening). This way of incorporating judgment is not the same as the one proposed by Svensson, which he represents by the inclusion in the structural equations of the CB's macroeconomic model of an unobservable exogenous stochastic variable that is not generated by a simple process such as "an exogenous autoregressive process" (p. 433).
These exogenous deviations appear in the model's structural equations. "Judgment" is then the CB's estimate of these deviation variables. But it is unclear that this approach reflects the only, or even the best, way of representing the role of judgment in policymaking. 10 Thus the fact that the above-mentioned way of incorporating judgment is different from Svensson's seems to be beside the point, i.e., does not justify his quoted statement.
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Svensson suggests that "a third problem with simple instrument rules would seem to be that a once-and-for-all commitment to an instrument rule would not allow any improvement of the … rule when new information about the transmission mechanism, the variability of shocks, or the source of shocks arrives" (p. 442). But the words "would seem" appear in the foregoing quotation because Svensson does not actually make the foregoing argument. After mentioning it, he goes on to recognize that Woodford's (1999) itself to an explicit objective function, which is a necessary condition for either the general or this would hardly seem to reflect what most analysts would think of as "judgment". It would be, rather, a complex rule. 11 We do not mean to deny that Svensson has insightful and constructive observations to make regarding incorporation of judgment; our objection is to the asymmetry that he paints with respect to such incorporation via targeting and instrument rules. 12 For discussions, see Woodford (1999) and Svensson and Woodford (2003) . 
Additional Objections
Two other debatable points deserve some brief attention, before we turn to a major analytical issue in Sections 5 and 6. One of these concerns Svensson's argument against the view that "simple instrument rules fit actual central-bank behavior well" (p. 444). In opposition to this idea, Svensson states that "even the best empirical fits leave one third or more of the variance of changes in the [interest instrument] rate unexplained." In this regard
it is important to note that the statement pertains to the variability of first differences of the interest rate, as found in the study by Judd and Rudebusch (1998) . In terms of levels, the fraction of the variance that is unexplained is approximately 0.02 (i.e., about 2 percent).
14 Neither of these measures is "correct," of course, but to put matters in perspective, we note
13 Note that at a minimum it would be necessary for the CB to state explicitly its value for the objective function parameter labeled λ below and in Svensson's eq. (2.2).
that 33 percent would be a comparatively small unexplained variance fraction for the first difference of most important variables in typical quarterly macroeconometric models. In the well-known Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) These do not refer to targeting rules or optimal control exercises, but discuss instrument rules quite explicitly-see, e.g., Cote, Lam, Liu, and St-Amant (2002) . Another relevant reference to the use of instrument rules in Canadian policy is provided by Longworth and O'Reilly (2002) . At the risk of being excessively repetitive, let it be said explicitly that we do not claim that the Bank of Canada-or any actual central bank-strictly follows an instrument 14 Judd and Rudebusch (1998, p. 14) report a residual standard deviation of 0.27 for the Greenspan period 1987 Q3−1997 Q4. Over that span, the standard deviation of the quarterly average funds rate is 1.93 (annual percentage units). Thus the unexplained fraction of variability is (0.27/1.93) 2 = 0.0196. 15 These figures pertain to the model's "inflation equation" and "output equation," for which the reported residual standard errors are 1.009 and 0.819 (Rudebusch and Svensson 1999, p. 208) "For a 1 per cent rise in British inflation, the British interest rate would, other things being equal, tend to rise by 1.5 per cent" (Brown, 2003) .
In the case of New Zealand, descriptions of the Reserve Bank's policy procedures (e.g., Hampton, 2002) 
Volatility from Instrument Rules?
We now turn to our main analytical discussion. Svensson's subsection 5.5 expresses sharp and specific disagreement with a crucial argument made by McCallum (1999 McCallum ( , p. 1493 and McCallum and Nelson (2000a) concerning the relationship between targeting and instrument rules. In particular, these two papers argue that an instrument rule can be written so as to entail instrument responses that would tend to bring about the satisfaction of any specific target rule (which usually amounts to a first-order condition for CB optimality). By increasing the response coefficient attached to the discrepancy between the relevant prevailing conditions and the desired first-order condition, the average discrepancy can be made arbitrarily small. 16 Thus, in a sense one can accomplish with an instrument rule anything that can be accomplished with a specific targeting rule, according to our argument.
Svensson (p. 461) has objected to this argument, however, on the grounds that "this is a dangerous and completely impracticable idea. It is completely inconceivable in practical monetary policy to have reaction functions with very large response coefficients, since the slightest mistake in calculating the argument of the reaction function would have grave consequences and result in extreme instrument-rate volatility." A similar objection is expressed, in milder language, by Svensson and Woodford (2003) .
Our intuition was that imbedding a first-order condition in an instrument rule with a large but finite reaction coefficient (such as µ 1 below) would typically entail less severe instrument movements than would imposition of the relevant specific targeting rule, since the latter is equivalent to use of an "infinite" reaction coefficient. 17 In other cases, large µ 1 values might entail somewhat greater interest volatility but in such cases the magnitude of this volatility would approach that obtained with the targeting rule as µ 1 grows without bound. In our paper (2000a) we did not, however, explore the effects of mistakes in calculating the argument of the reaction function. In the following paragraphs we shall, accordingly, investigate the validity of Svensson's conjecture.
For this exercise, suppose initially that the economy is represented by the following model, which is a version of the neo-canonical specification used by Bullard and Mitra 16 The sign of the response coefficient must, of course, be appropriate-so that policy is tightened when aggregate demand needs to be reduced, etc. 17 It is important to note that-in contrast to Svensson's suggestion on p. 461-we actually do not recommend the adoption of a large reaction coefficient; see McCallum and Nelson (2000a, pp. 20-24) . Our point, instead, is that an instrument rule with a large reaction coefficient is less open to Svensson's objection than is its associated specific targeting rule.
(2002), Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1999) , Jensen (2002) , Woodford (1999 ), McCallum and Nelson (1999b , 2000a , and many others:
(1)
Here, y t is the output gap, π t is the inflation rate, and R t is the one-period nominal interest rate. Equation (1) is the now-familiar expectational IS function and (2) is the Calvo price adjustment relation-both consistent under well-known assumptions with optimizing behavior by individuals in the economy (e.g., Woodford, 2003) .
Supposing that the CB wishes to minimize the loss function
the optimum first-order condition in the absence of commitment is π t = −(λ/α)y t , or, (2000a) is
where r is the average long-run real rate of interest. The term r , which is included along with π t so as to express (4) in a Taylor-style form, is normalized to zero by expressions (1) and (2). For present purposes the interest-rate smoothing coefficient µ 2 may also be set equal to zero, yielding
To incorporate mistakes of the type contemplated by Svensson, we modify (3) and (4) to become (3') π t + (λ /α)y t + e t = 0 and (4') R t = (1−µ 2 ){ r
where e t represents a stochastic mistake term. We have included the same mistake term e t into both the targeting and instrument rule, a step that seems necessary to provide a reasonable basis for comparison. Since the issue is whether use of an instrument rule (with a large µ 1 parameter) leads to excessive variability (when there are policy errors) in comparison to the corresponding targeting rule, it would make no sense to omit the errors from the targeting rule.
In our experiments, we shall treat e t as a first-order autoregressive (AR(1)) processusually as white noise-with AR parameter ρ e and innovation ε t (standard deviation σ ε ).
Various values for σ ε and ρ e are considered. Behavioral parameter values for the model are taken to be b 1 = −0.5, α = 0.03, and β = 0.99. Also, the stochastic shock term ξ t in (1) includes a term reflecting t y − E t 1 + t y , which must be included-in addition to a white noise preference shock v t -because (1) and (2) are expressed in terms of the output gap rather than output. The natural-rate value t y is assumed to follow a first-order autoregressive process with AR parameter 0.95 and innovation standard deviation 0.007. The white noise preference shock has standard deviation 0.02 and the shock term u t in the price adjustment equation (2) is taken to be white noise with standard deviation 0.005. For the results given below, the value of the CB preference parameter λ is set at 0.1.
We begin by reporting in Table 1 results of using different values for the feedback parameter µ 1 (setting µ 2 = 0 here and in subsequent cases). The first column pertains to the µ 1 value of 0.5, as suggested by Taylor (1993) . Successive columns then use values of 5.0 and 50.0. Finally, the last column includes results for "µ 1 = ∞," i.e., for the targeting rule (3'). In each cell, two values are reported. The first is the unconditional expected value of the loss function, which is (with β = 0.99) 100 times the unconditional expectation of the single-period loss. The second is the standard deviation of R t , the interest rate instrument.
These values are based on analytical expressions for the unconditional variances of π t , y t , and R t implied by the model-plus-rule systems.
The first row of Table 1 gives results for the reference case in which there is no e t mistake term. The pattern is similar to those in McCallum and Nelson (2000a, Table 4 ) in that the value of the loss function with the instrument rule (4') approaches the value with the target-rule first-order condition (3'). Here, however, the R t standard deviation (SD) values are also reported. Not surprisingly, they also show the instrument-rule values approaching the targeting-rule value smoothly as µ 1 grows without bound. In the second row the mistake or error term e t is included as white noise with a SD of 0.002. With this small variability, the results are not much affected. Then in row three the SD of e t is increased to a magnitude that is similar to that of the other model shocks. In this case again, nevertheless, there is no tendency for the large µ 1 values to generate poor performance. Indeed, the variability of R t is slightly smaller with µ 1 = 50 than with the targeting rule holding exactly. (The same remains true if we set µ 1 = 500.) For more stringent tests, we increase the SD of the error term by a factor of ten in the fourth row and then, in row five, revert to 0.02 for the innovation SD but with an autoregressive parameter of σ e = 0.8. In both these cases the SD of the interest rate increases slightly as we switch from a large µ 1 coefficient value of 50 in the instrument rule to the use of the analogous targeting rule. Table 2 repeats the same experiments from Table 1 but with the first-order targeting rule and its instrument-rule version pertaining to policy behavior of the "timeless perspective" type of commitment, rather than discretion. 19 In this case, the optimality condition is
and the analogous instrument rule (with µ 2 = 0) is
when the e t mistake terms are included. Here the values and patterns are quite different than in Table 1 , but the same finding vis-à-vis Svensson's conjecture is obtained. There is, in other words, no tendency for large µ 1 values in (5) to lead to high R t volatility or to poor performance, in comparison with the specific targeting-rule results of condition (5).
Model with Predetermined Output and Inflation
There are various modifications to the model (1)-(2) that could be examined, 20 to determine whether the foregoing results obtain generally, but one in particular is of special relevance. This modification stems from recognition that the examples in Svensson's (2003) paper are worked out in terms of models (pp. 432−435) in which agents' actions in period t have no effect on output or inflation until period t+1. Accordingly, we now modify our model (1)−(2) so as to possess that property. Thus consider the following specification, in which symbols are the same as above.
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(7)
Here we have used the law of iterated expectations, e.g., E t−1 (E t X t+1 ) = E t−1 X t+1 . With this modification, the optimal discretionary first-order condition imposed in period t-i.e., the specific targeting rule-becomes Svensson, p. 452 .) Accordingly, the implied instrument rule with µ 2 = 0 and r = 0 is
Again the relevant experiment, designed to compare these two approaches with policy mistakes, entails specifications with random error terms included in both rules. The model to be solved then consists of equations (7), (8), and either
Here the random mistake terms are dated t−1 so as to respect the notion that output and inflation in t are predetermined. (For discussion of an alternative timing, see the Appendix.)
Before turning to more complex cases, let us consider an analytical solution for the simple special case in which discretion obtains and the three disturbance terms are all white noises. Then the MSV solution to the system (7), (8), and (11) The case just examined is, however, excessively special. Indeed, inspection of the solutions given above shows that, for the discretionary case with all white noise shocks, there is no effect of different µ 1 values on the mean value (unconditional expectation) of the objective function. In other words, with no source of serial correlation in the model, and the existence of an information lag, the discretionary policy rule has no stabilizing properties for π t and y t in the model (7) In Tables 3 and 4 we report numerical results with the model (7)−(8). Again we report standard deviations based on analytical covariances. In most of the cases, the standard deviation of the policy-error term is kept at σ ε = 0.02. For Table 3 , which pertains to discretionary behavior, the policy specifications are (11) and (12) for the targeting and instrument rules whereas in Table 4 , with timeless perspective behavior, the relevant rules are (14) and (15). In both tables the first three rows apply to cases with white noise shocks so we see that, as in the analytical solution given above, policy activism is not helpful in achieving policy objectives. Indeed, when policy errors are included, as in rows 2 and 3, the activist rules tend to be harmful. This should not be greatly surprising, since there are no general optimality results pertaining to the formulations being considered. In the final two rows of each table serially correlated shocks are present, however, so policy activism can potentially be helpful. 22 Indeed, in Table 4 we see that larger values of µ 1 lead to reduced values of the loss function.
Be that as it may, with regard to the issue at hand the results are clear-cut: there is no tendency for the variability of R t to grow alarmingly with large values of µ 1 . Indeed, the variability of R t is smaller with large values of µ 1 used in the instrument rule than with the associated specific targeting rule. In addition, the results provided by the targeting rules (11) and (14) are, as before, very closely approximated by those of the instrument rules (12) and (15) for large values of µ 1 . 22 Where autocorrelation is included in the u t process, the innovation variance is kept at 0.005 2 .
Conclusion
Svensson (2003) argues strongly that general and specific targeting rules, which amount to commitments to specified objective functions and first-order conditions (respectively), are normatively superior to instrument rules for the conduct of monetary policy. By contrast, we suggest that it is unhelpful to refer to "general targeting rules" as policy rules, from a terminological perspective, and that substantively their adoption is either innocuous or else represents a departure from transparency. Most of the present paper's discussion is focused, accordingly, upon specific targeting rules-i.e., the first-order optimality conditions implied by the combination of a specific objective function and a specific model.
Svensson's argument that specific targeting rules are superior to instrument rules is based largely upon four main objections to the latter plus a claim concerning the relative interest-instrument variability entailed by the two approaches. Our Section 3 considers the four objections in turn, and advances arguments that contradict all of them. Then in the paper's analytical sections (5 and 6), it is demonstrated that the variability claim is incorrect, for a neo-canonical model and also for a variant with one-period-ahead plans used by Svensson, providing that the same decision-making errors are relevant under the two alternative approaches.
We suggest, then, that despite its large quantity of meticulous analysis, Svensson is apparently inconsistent with the information assumptions of Svensson (2003) and Svensson and Woodford (2003, pp. 12−13) . In addition, the rationale for assuming that actions by private agents in period t depend upon lagged information does not carry over to the case of R t , since asset market prices are in reality observable on a day-to-day or hour-tohour basis. Table 1 Results with Model ( .0403 Table 2 Results with Model ( .0460 Table 3 Results with Model (7) Table 4 Results with Model (7) 
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